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4 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed NRO Agreement

1. The attached is a draft NRO agreement which resulted from discussions with Dr. Fubini and Mr. Vance. The draft has been altered substantially from the original draft.

2. The net effect of the change resulting from discussions with Dr. Fubini is to pretty much eliminate the line responsibility of the NRO (always an objective in our negotiations). Research, development and production of "sensors" (e.g., cameras) will be done by the "component of the Government best equipped" to do so (hopefully, in large measure, by CIA). Boosters, spacecraft and reentry vehicles will be generally assigned to the Air Force for development purposes. Allocation of responsibility for ongoing systems will be made prior to the execution of any agreement.

3. DDS&T feels strongly that the proposed agreement is unacceptable as the interrelationship between "sensors" and spacecraft and reentry vehicles is so close that responsibility for one is meaningless without authority to develop the other. In other words he feels that the Agency must be given authority to develop and produce the whole "payload" package which includes space and reentry vehicles as well as "sensors." To some extent DDS&T's concern, it seems to me, is mitigated by language appearing at the

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bottom of D.1.4., which is supposed to ensure that spacecraft are designed to accommodate sensors rather than vice versa.

4. A major contentious issue in the draft is language in paragraph B (1, 2, 3 and 4) which provides that the Secretary of Defense will have the ultimate responsibility for management of the NRO; would choose the DNRO who will report to the Secretary of Defense; and will "have the final power" to approve the NRP budget. Personally, I think that this language merely recognizes reality and should be accepted subject to some provision specifically recognizing the authority of the Executive Committee. Similarly, language in paragraph E.2. gives the DNRO "responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP" subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee. Here again, I think that CIA should be able to live with this language and will find adequate protection from:

a. An effective DDNRO appointed from CIA; and

b. A reasonably friendly, patriotic and responsible new leadership in the Air Force in the form of Messrs. Brown, Paul and Flax.

5. I would recommend adoption of the proposed agreement provided there is prior agreement that CIA's responsibility for the following projects is recognized.

a. Operational control of the IDEALIST and OXCART programs;

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b. Production and improvement of CORONA payloads;

c. Design, development and production of

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and

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d. Development and production of a new general search program.

/s/ John A. Bross

JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

Attachment

Draft NRO Agreement (31/7/65)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - DCI
- 3 - DDCI
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50X1

DRAFT 31 July 1965

AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

A. The National Reconnaissance Program

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence need of the government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U. S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board.

Targeting and requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.

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B. The Secretary of Defense

1. Will establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD and
will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation
of the NRO and the NRP;

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2. Will choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him
and be responsive to his instructions;

3. Will concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of DNRO
who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;

4. Will review and have the final power to approve the NRP
budget;

5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when nec-
essary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement
could not be reached.

C. The Director of Central Intelligence will

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for
the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency
of coverage;

2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if
appropriate, steps for improving such results;

3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;

4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;

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5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and the DNRO is hereby established to guide and participate in the [✓]
formulation of the NRP. ~~through the DNRO. (The DNRO will sit~~
~~with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member.)~~ If the Executive Committee can not agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee shall:

a. ~~(Establish)~~ Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.

c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for

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new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained ✓ by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD.

d. ~~Allocate~~ Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. ~~In general the Executive Committee will assign the responsibility for~~ Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in

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recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance.



f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by ~~the DNRO and~~ such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence consider desirable.

E. National Reconnaissance Office

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the SOC which shall be jointly manned. ✓

2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director NRO:

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, shall have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP.

b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section D above, shall have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the



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Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements.

c. Shall have authority to require that he be keptfully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.

d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee (~~or to their designated representatives~~) records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds

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expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in a line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion to reflect ~~the~~ ^{and} best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department.

F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities

1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto.

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence

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